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FOREWORD

If a host of pundits are to be believed, we are fast
approaching “the Pacific Century,” and, many of them
argue, the centerpiece of the new era will be China. Some
forecasts have China rising to become the world’s largest
economy over the next two decades, and acquiring attendant political and military power in the process.
Unquestionably, China’s size, population and burgeoning economy will elevate it to a more prominent role in Asia,
the Pacific and the world by 2020. All the more reason then
for those concerned with America’s security to develop a
keener understanding of this rising giant.
Perhaps a good place to start is with some introspection
about ourselves in relation to the Chinese. Lieutenant
Colonel Susan Puska, in the monograph that follows, provides just such an examination of the reciprocal relations
between China and the United States over the past century
and a half. She articulates the theme that cycles of misperception have characterized the relationship. If this past is
prologue, then potential conflict looms darkly over future
U.S.-China interactions.
The first step toward precluding conflict, according to
the author, is to understand the nature of the past relationship. Then, the two countries must overcome the deep perceptual gap between their cultures, their historical views
and their ideological perspectives. Such understanding,
widely shared in each society, will not assure development of
bilateral partnership, but is essential to giving it a chance.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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NEW CENTURY, OLD THINKING:
THE DANGERS OF THE PERCEPTUAL GAP
IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION
American angst over “China” and how to deal with it has
spurred a seemingly endless cycle of U.S. policy debates.
Each disagreement or new revelation, such as the recent
allegation that the Chinese tried to buy influence through
illegal funding to U.S. elections,1 feeds another round of
charges that U.S. leaders are either too “soft” or too “hard”
on China. These charges are usually punctuated by
warnings that these actions could lead to dire consequences
for the United States in the future.
Although their deliberations are largely hidden, Chinese
leaders also debate how best to manage the “America
problem.” Chinese policies toward the United States, as
with U.S. policies toward China, have been inconsistent and
contradictory, ranging from the current pragmatic decision
to downplay differences between the two countries to the
dangerously hostile confrontation over Taiwan in March
1996.
Since Tiananmen in 1989, U.S.-China state relations
have been punctuated by one crisis after another. Between
each crisis there have been brief, but exuberant attempts to
make a “breakthrough” which could once and for all set
relations on a stable course. Events in 1996 and 1997 have
been particularly illustrative of this U.S.-China bilateral
roller coaster ride. These 2 years highlight the difficulties
that thwart attempts to stabilize U.S.-China relations in
the post-Cold War period. They also foreshadow the dangers
and risks inherent in U.S.-China relations as the 21st
century approaches.
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The up and down cycles of U.S.-China state relations
during the 1990s are only a subset of a boom-bust paradigm
(Figure 1), which has characterized state relations
throughout the last 150 years. Based fundamentally on
historic U.S. superiority, in terms of the economic, political
and military elements of national power,2 this paradigm has
persisted almost uninterrupted until the present. The brief
periods of the U.S.-China alliance during World War II and
during the strategic anti-Soviet relationship of the 1970s
have been anomalies within the dominant pattern.
Supporting and fueling this paradigm at each stage is a
profound perceptual gap between the United States and
China that is fed by at least three major sources: philosophical and cultural differences, historical experience, and
ideological differences. This perceptual gap has helped give
the boom-bust paradigm a life of its own in state-to-state
relations between the United States and China, primarily
because countervailing bilateral interests have most often
either been lacking entirely or they have been insufficient to
counterbalance it.
If this paradigm persists in U.S.-China state relations
into the 21st century, it will likely continue to reduce
options and opportunities for resolution of disagreements
between the two countries. Over time, it could lead to a
downward spiral in state relations, resulting in increasing
levels of confrontation, hostility, and even war.
The perceptual gap has been a ubiquitous feature of
U.S.-China relations since at least the 19th century;
however, it has reemerged with a vengeance since June 4,
1989, within the changing context of successful
modernization and economic development within China.
Misperceptions do contribute to serious mutual miscalculations. For example, the United States miscalculated
how China would ultimately respond to the Lee Tenghui
visit to the United States in April 1995. When China
conducted exercises in March 1996 near Taiwan, it also
likely miscalculated how the United States would respond
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Figure 1.
and what effect the exercise would have on the perception of
China within the Asia-Pacific Region.
An understanding of the perceptual gap and of the
potential for dangerous miscalculations is of vital
importance to bilateral relations between the United States
and China. Miscalculations of intentions and capabilities by
either or both countries can play a critical role in precipitating confrontation. Often based on underestimation or
overestimation, miscalculations historically have been
factors in the outbreak of war.3 In the future, miscalculations by either or both countries on potentially explosive
issues, such as Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan or the
Spratly Islands, could push the United States and China
toward long-term confrontation and conflict.
Fundamental to why the perpetuation of this paradigm
is dangerous is the concrete change that is occurring in the
power relationship between the two countries as China’s
economy continues to modernize and grow in real terms.
Although China’s presumed rise to great power, even
superpower, status remains somewhat theoretical,4 China’s
3

comprehensive power, in terms of economic growth,
political influence, and (to a much lesser extent) military
capability,5 has grown dramatically since the 1980s. At the
same time, the United States, the only remaining
superpower of the post-Cold War era, faces the prospect of
decline at least in relative terms, as other powers, such as
China or Germany, rise to level the international playing
field over the long term.
The psychological impact of China’s presumed rise adds
a volatile dimension to U.S.-China state relations. For
China, the possibility of this change in power relations
presents an intoxicating opportunity, which has eluded
China for well over a century, to gain a dominant position
within the Asia-Pacific region and the world. For the United
States, such a change in the power relationship with China
raises an uncertain, if not fearsome, specter of major
change, even loss, in terms of international influence,
prestige, and possibly way of life. This psychological
dimension, I think, is at the heart of the current China
threat and U.S. threat arguments in each country.
This paper primarily examines the psychological
dimension of U.S.-China state-to-state relations. It argues
that the primary reason for the lurching nature of bilateral
policies (on both sides) is a corrosive perceptual gap between
the United States and China, that the policy debates reflect,
and which dominates bilateral relations in the absence of
countervailing bilateral or strategic interests. The paper
will examine this perceptual gap from cultural, historical
and ideological aspects, and correlate it to the role
perceptions and misperceptions played out in politicalmilitary aspects of U.S.-China relations. As a historical
U.S.-China example, the paper will discuss the outbreak of
the Korean War in terms of mutual misperceptions. In
conclusion, it offers some suggestions to break the paradigm
and help establish normal state-to-state relations between
the two countries.
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PART ONE:
U.S.-CHINA PERCEPTUAL GAP

PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES
I had learned enough about Americans to treat them as
ordinary human beings.
Liu Zongren6
The experience of China means that you will never again see
singly; the contrary of every idea in your life and culture looks
as sane and reasonable as the idea itself. Your consciousness is
bifurcated once and for all . . . Every old truth is half a new lie,
every perception half a deception.
Bill Holm7

The perceptual gap between the United States and
China is a by-product of their philosophical and cultural
differences, historical experience, and residual ideological
differences. People who work in business, academic,
cultural, and government relations between the two countries are frequently challenged to unravel miscommunications and misunderstandings that arise from this
baggage. Often there is a complete break in understanding
what is important to the other party and why. For example,
in official meetings, it is common for the Chinese to measure
their success in handling the Americans on the basis of
form, while Americans will often define success in terms of
the substance discussed or agreed upon by the Chinese.
When Americans fail to satisfy the Chinese need for
form, they risk offending the Chinese and undermining
feelings of goodwill, thus further degrading opportunities
(however slight) for progress on issues of substance. When
the Chinese fail to satisfy the American need for substance,
they risk disappointing the Americans, fueling distrust and
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also undermining goodwill. Underlying this form-substance
gap is the Chinese emphasis on personal relations. Even in
sensitive official relationships, such as military-to-military
relations, the Chinese resist establishing institutional ties,
preferring informal contacts and relying on trusted
intermediaries. While useful to some degree, this informal
relationship has clear limits to the U.S. military where
normal, non-adversarial relations with foreign militaries
are characterized by regularization, institutional ties, and
reciprocity, all of which help build mutual trust,
communication, and cooperation, and help mitigate the
possibility of misperception of intentions and capability.
The Chinese preference for form versus the American
preference for substance can be better understood by
looking at the philosophical roots which formed the world
view of the Chinese and the West more than 2,000 years ago.
David Hall and Roger Ames8 have traced the earliest
philosophical differences between the West and China to
the period from 800-200 B.C., by which time dramatically
different world views had developed. China’s world view
became based primarily on analogical or correlative
thinking, while the West’s became based on rational and
causal thinking,9 though each culture still retains recessive
elements of the other’s thought process.
Western thinking presupposes the beginning of things
arising from chaos; a single-ordered world; the priority of
stasis over change (being over becoming); and, the belief in
some agency of construal, such as the Will of God, and that
the agency of construal ultimately determines the state of
affairs of the world.10 In contrast, Chinese thinking does not
presume:
an initial beginning nor of the existence of a single ordered
world. This mode of thinking accepts the priority of change or
process over rest and permanence, presumes no ultimate
agency responsible for the general order of things, and seeks to
account for states of affairs by appeal to correlative procedures
rather than by determining agencies and principles.11

6

These differences give rise to very different perspectives
of time, for example, that often negatively affect dealings
between the two countries. For the Chinese, time is an
open-ended process with no beginning and no end. In a
sense, time has “no value” to the Chinese because it is
eternal.12 While the Chinese tend to take the long view,
looking backward to over 5,00013 years of continuous
civilization with special pride, Americans tend to look more
to the future and emphasize how fleeting time is.
Consequently, the American tendency to be impatient for
change often clashes with the seemingly eternal patience of
the Chinese.
I frequently encountered this view of time in 1988-89 in
discussions with Chinese, even among students who were
toying with the idea of democracy in China. Contrary to
popular views in the United States, these students
demanded greater democracy (specifically the vote) for
themselves as intellectuals, but they had a much different
view of what was appropriate for the majority—the
peasants. Most argued that the “backward” and
“uneducated” peasants were not yet ready for democracy
and would first need time to develop culturally. When I
asked how long this would take, it was not unusual for the
students to suggest that 50-100 years, or one or more
generations, would be required.14
The main elements of the perceptual gap between the
United States and China can be depicted as in Figure 2.
Although both cultures can and do occasionally cross the
line to selectively adopt elements of the other culture’s
world view, both the United States and China tend to stay
within the boundaries of their own preferences. These
fundamental philosophical differences, which are imbedded
within each culture and are largely diametrically opposed to
one another, help explain why miscommunication often
arises between China and the United States.
Ames and Hall suggest further that the American
tendency to universalize Western values is a direct outcome
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Figure 2. U.S.-China Perceptual Gap.
of Western causal and linear thinking.15 Americans tend to
see the spread of Western values as a sacred mission, based
on universal principles which are guided by a higher order
than the mere will of man. America’s own national interests
are often linked to the attainment of universal principles.
The 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement (NSS),16 for example, explicitly linked
U.S. national interests and global conditions:
This national security strategy . . . is premised on the belief that
the line between our domestic and foreign policies is
disappearing - that we must revitalize our economy if we are to
sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global
influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to
open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.17

The urgency which the 1996 NSS attached to promoting
democracy and market economies rested on the belief that:
Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and
maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with
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growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more
likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And
democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and
more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet
security threats and promote free trade and sustainable
development.18

The 1997 report, A National Security Strategy for a New
Century,19 retained the concept of engagement, but dropped
direct reference to enlargement. Nonetheless, the
promotion of democracy and human rights20 remained a
core objective of the NSS:21
We seek international support in helping strengthen
democratic and free market institutions and norms . . . This
commitment . . . is not only just, but pragmatic, for
strengthened democratic institutions benefit the U.S. and the
world.22

In China, the U.S. commitment to globally spread
democracy and human rights, which are based upon Western values, is seen as a threat to China and to things
Chinese. This runs much deeper than simply the views of a
minority Communist Party, which would be directly
threatened by the democratic order that America seeks to
promote in China. Even ordinary Chinese citizens,
including Chinese students, bristle at the missionary-like
U.S. vision of how to change China for its own good. Like
those of the Christian missionaries of the 19th and early
20th centuries, U.S. goals for China (and other countries, as
well) are based on the fundamental assumption that U.S.
values are not only applicable to China, but also must be
promoted regardless of the domestic consequences, such as
revolution or widespread violence.
The conflict that can arise between U.S. causal thinking
and Chinese correlative thinking can be seen more clearly
by comparing both countries’ national security strategies
(Figure 3). Although China and the United States both seek
security, stability, and greater prosperity, the criteria for
attaining these goals are vastly different. The U.S. NSS
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Figure 3. Comparison of U.S. and Chinese National
Strategies.
defines security, stability, and prosperity in terms of the
mutually reinforcing aspects of democracy, free market
economy, and the promotion of American values. China
adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, a
product of its border confrontation with India, as its
foundation for state-to-state relations. These principles
promote its national interests and limit outside interference
in Chinese internal affairs. As a basis for its security, China
further seeks sovereignty over all of its claimed territory
including not only Hong Kong, which was reunited with
China earlier this year, and Macao, which will be reunified
with China in 1999, but also with places where its
sovereignty is contested, such as the Spratly23 and
Senkakus (Diaoyutai) Islands, and Taiwan, which has been
separated from Beijing since 1949 as an unresolved legacy
of the Chinese civil war.
The Chinese ambivalence toward the West, which is
often marked by a rejection of foreign influence as well as
interference, combined with a need for foreign capital and
technology to help China modernize and thereby resist the
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West, has been a recurring dilemma for China since the
19th century. In a series of essays, the scholar Feng Guifen
argued that although “the intelligence and wisdom of the
Chinese are necessarily superior to those of the various
barbarians,”24 China must strengthen itself (ziqiang) by
adopting some foreign methods in order to meet the
Western challenge.25 Feng’s ideas helped inspire the SelfStrengthening Movement of the late 19th century as an
attempt to restore the power of the Qing Dynasty by seeking
foreign aid and investment, machines, weapons, and
technology to strengthen China against the West in the
belief that “China would first learn from foreigners, then
equal them, and finally surpass them,”26 and fundamentally
“emphasize[d] China’s autonomy and initiative.”27
Deng Xiaoping’s formula for building socialism with
Chinese characteristics,28 which he articulated in the
opening speech of the Twelfth Party Congress on September
1, 1982, remains true to much of the sentiment of the
self-strengthening concepts of the 19th century. Deng first
rejected “the mechanical copying and application of foreign
experiences and models” and urged listeners to base China’s
development on “the concrete realities of China, [and] blaze
a path of our own.”29
From its unique perspective, China today seeks to build
its comprehensive national strength from a strong economic
foundation. “National wealth achieved through economic
development” is the “core of China’s national interest.”30
Priority is given to the development of economic power,
since to be sustainable over the long term, other elements,
such as the military and political power, must be based on a
strong economy. To support these goals, peace and stability
are viewed as “a guarantee for China’s economic development.”31
The goals of the U.S. NSS conflict in at least two
fundamental ways with China’s own goals for maintaining
national security.32 First, the United States sees its
national security irrevocably dependent upon the
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promotion of global democracy and market economies.
China has accepted the value of market economy, but it is
market economy with Chinese characteristics. China seeks
to protect and channel its internal energy in ways that are
advantageous and supportive of its own interests.
Democracy is even more problematic to Chinese leaders,
who view it as a direct attack on their power and as a threat
to the stability of the nation that could potentially throw the
country into the chaos of internal revolution, once more
depriving China of its century-plus dream to recapture past
glory and power regionally and within the international
community. Economic development is thus firmly linked to
Chinese nationalism, and those who would thwart China’s
development can be easily cast as opponents of China.
Second, China does not necessarily buy into the
universality of Western values, many of which conflict with
Chinese values in the same way that core philosophical
differences conflict. As shown in Figure 4, these main value
differences include the American emphasis on the
individual versus the Chinese stress on the group; the
American preference for the rule of law versus the Chinese
reliance on personal relationships; and a fundamentally
different view of human rights. Although largely dismissed
as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda by
pro-human rights proponents in the West, many common
Chinese people do have a different view of human rights,
based more on the collective good (stability) than on the
rights of the individual. The American emphasis on
“inalienable” and “self-evident” rights embodied in the U.S.
Bill of Rights often does not seem as compelling to those who
are trying to achieve basic human needs, such as food and
shelter, and when the cost of such individualism may be
internal chaos and national weakness.
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HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
American policies toward China display a fatal flaw: their lack
of . . . history. This deficiency alone destines them to be devoid
of long-term, enlightened strategic thinking. It also dooms
Sino-U.S. relations to periodic collisions.
China Can Say No33
The importance of history does not lie in what happened, but
in what people think happened and in the significance they
ascribe to that image of past events.
Dennison I. Rusinow34

The complex history of U.S.-China relations adds some
concrete and mythological dimensions to the perceptual gap
between the two countries. The pattern of relations, as
previously shown in Figure 1, has largely been a love-hate
pattern since the 19th century. In his 1958 work on
American views toward China, the journalist Harold
Isaacs35 describes this cyclic pattern as a series of six
different periods (ages) in state relations until 1949: respect
(18th century); contempt (1840-1905); benevolence
(1905-1937); admiration (1937-1944); disenchantment
(1944-1949); and hostility (beginning in 1949).36
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Building on Isaacs’ chronology, Steven W. Mosher
extended the Age of Hostility from 1949 to 1972, when
President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong brokered the
historic reopening of relations. He also added three phases
up until 1989: The Second Age of Admiration (1972-1977);
the Second Age of Disenchantment (1977-1980); and the
Second Age of Benevolence (1980-1989).37
Relying on extensive documentary evidence, Warren
Cohen more succinctly divided American perceptions of
China into five eras: deference (1784-1841), contempt
(1841-1900), paternalism (1900-1950), fear (1950-1971),
and respect (beginning in 1971).38 This division loses
visibility over some of the internal ups and downs within
each period that Isaacs and Mosher more clearly identify,
but retains the major American perceptions of China today.
As reflected in the ongoing policy debates and analysis of
China and its rise as a great power, one can see emotions
ranging from contempt of Chinese human rights practices
to fear of China’s long-term intentions. There are also
persistent elements of paternalism as Americans seek to
transform the Chinese system along Western and U.S.
lines, with only furtive and grudging signs of respect.
Arkush and Lee correlated Chinese images of the United
States to Cohen’s periodization of American perceptions of
China. Beginning in 1841, about the time when Chinese
officials, such as Xu Jiyu, the governor of Fujian Province,
began publishing accounts of the United States,39 Arkush
and Lee identified four different periods that reflect the
inherent ambiguity of Chinese perceptions of the United
States: exotic wonderment and fear (1841-1900);
admiration of the American model, combined with criticism
of flaws in its values (1900-1950); rampant anti-Americanism in mainland China, combined with “friendly
familiarity” in Taiwan (1950-1971); and “rediscovery and
respect” (1971-1989).40
Of these different periods, the time frames between 1841
and 1950 are especially useful in providing historical
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perspective on mutual perceptions between China and the
United States prior to the Cold War. The ideological
influence of the Cold War is a separate dimension to the
perceptual gap. It not only polarized and bifurcated
relations between the United States and the two China’s
until 1971, but also provided the rationale for the reopening
of relations in the 1970s. It therefore should be considered
as an important, but separate, component.
Such cyclic and emotionally-charged swings in the
history of bilateral relations have left a mutual legacy of old
resentments and disappointments, as well as recurrently
unrealistic hopes and expectations that haunt mutual
perceptions and misperceptions today. Within the context of
the persistent aftermath of Tiananmen, this historical
legacy has rebounded with an astounding resilience. It has
helped feed nationalistic anger in China, albeit manipulated and exploited by the leaders of a largely irrelevant
communist ideology. In the United States this legacy is
manifested in repeated attempts to moralize, condemn, and
change China on behalf of the Chinese people and perceived
universal norms of behavior. Underlying both these
perceptual extremes has been the resurgence of negative
views which dominated during the Cold War.
1841-1900: American Contempt versus Chinese
Wonderment and Fear.
When reviewing the history of U.S.-China relations
before 1989, several patterns (and not a few ironies) stand
out. The extreme anti-Chinese sentiment that the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 (and subsequent laws) reflected until
it was repealed in 1943 is instructive in that it was the first
and only time U.S. law singled out a nationality for
exclusion from America, even after the United States
paternalistically sought to save, protect, and transform
China after 1900, and even after China and the United
States became allies against Japan in World War II.
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The Chinese Exclusion Act and subsequent laws, in the
words of John King Fairbanks, “made racism our national
policy” and prompted the Chinese to initiate their first
anti-foreign boycott of U.S. goods.41 These discriminatory
laws expressed American beliefs of the time that the
C h in ese people wer e “c ul tur al l y and r ac i al l y
unassimilable.”42 Scores of Chinese immigrants were
murdered in the western United States during anti-Chinese
riots in the 1870s and 1880s. The prejudice and violence
inflicted on the Chinese people was caused not only by
domestic economic competition and uncertainty, but also by
the fundamental American perception that the Chinese
immigrant, beset with “unspeakable vices,”43 represented a
cultural, moral, and religious threat.
When viewing press coverage of China in the United
States since 1989, one can see unfortunate parallels to the
negative views of the late 19th century. With notable
exceptions, American journalists have focused on such
“unspeakable vices” as cannibalism during the Cultural
Revolution, buying and selling of women and children, and
female infanticide, thus presenting a negative and narrow
view of China.44
American negative views of China in the late 19th
century were reinforced by conditions in China itself. Many
Americans, as “fresh apostles of progress” after the end of
the Civil War and the opening of Western territories, saw
the Qing Dynasty as one in “decay, actually sunk in poverty,
filth, disease, corruption, thievery, and disorder, and
apparently unwilling to do anything about it.”45 America’s
western expansion helped fuel the belief that anything is
possible if people help themselves. This “self-help” ethos
sharply contrasted with American perceptions of China in
the late Qing era. China’s defeat in a series of disastrous and
humiliating military confrontations with Western powers
during the 19th century beginning with the first Opium War
of 1840 may have raised sympathy for China in the United
States, but did not earn respect for a country in decline and
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unable to respond to the challenge of Western trade and
modernization.
The Chinese Exclusion Act not only reflected prejudices
of the times, which most would condemn today, it also
reflected a “Yellow Peril” 46 fear, which sometimes
resurfaces even today and overshadows perceptions of
China’s rise in economic, political, and military power. This
irrational fear of the Chinese was shaped in the 19th
century by the enormity of China’s population, vast cultural
differences, and a perception of “unfair” domestic
competition from Chinese immigrants in America.
Although this fear was based on distorted views of China’s
role in the invasion of Europe in the 13th century by the
Mongols,47 it was also kindled by the anti-foreign Boxer
Rebellion of 1900, which John Fairbanks has described as
“one of the best known events of the 19th century because so
many diplomats, missionaries, and journalists”48 were
involved. Like Tiananmen in 1989, this event had enduring
effects on U.S.-China relations and mutual perceptions.
The Chinese perceptions of America during the late 19th
century largely incorporated the United States in the
general Chinese view of Western oppression (colonialism
and imperialism) and exploitation of China’s weakness.
“Gunboat diplomacy” achieved by use of force what political
diplomacy had failed to—the opening of China to trade with
the West. Beginning with the Opium War of 1840-42,49 a
series of “unequal treaties” were imposed on China, which
granted special extraterritorial privileges to foreigners and
took away Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and
elsewhere. Protected foreign enclaves were established
throughout China beyond the rule of Chinese law. Popular
symbols to represent this period of humiliation include
signs, such as that posted outside the waterfront park on the
Bund in Shanghai, which declared “no dogs or Chinese”
allowed.
Within this bitter context of weakness and humiliation
in China’s encounter with the West, the Boxer Rebellion of
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1900 is seen by the Chinese as a benchmark in its “antiimperialist and patriotic” struggle against foreign
oppression.50 But the Boxer Rebellion is only the best known
and most violent51 display of an anti-foreignism that has
repeatedly manifested itself in China since the 19th
century. Often this anti-foreignism has been intertwined
with Chinese nationalism and the quest for modernization,52 as well as with the need for demonstrations of
standing up to the West.53 This anti-foreign element can be
seen today in such comic heroes as “Soccer Boy,” who in a
CD-Rom version can fight and win the Opium War,54 or in
the popular television soap opera, “Foreign Babes in
Beijing,” built on “the most negative Chinese views of
foreign women.”55 The runaway bestseller of the summer of
1996, “The China That Can Say No,” written by five
co-authors56 who have never traveled outside of China,
reflects what the authors call a “post-colonial sentiment”
that resents “American demonization of China over issues
ranging from arms proliferation to human rights and family
planning”57 and “abstract struggles [with China] over
ideology and politics,”58 which ultimately seek to contain
China’s growth and development as a strong competitor of
the United States.
1900-1950: American Paternalism versus Chinese
Admiration and Criticism.
The foreign (including the United States) military
suppression of the Boxer Rebellion devastated parts of
northern China where the uprisings occurred. The ruins of
the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan), even today,
almost 100 years after the sumptuous imperial grounds
were occupied and razed by foreign troops, remain for the
Chinese a potent symbol of a time when China was impotent
to expel foreigners from its soil.
Heavy compensation was demanded of China in the
Boxer Protocol of 1901 in retribution for the loss of foreign
property and personnel. The debt, which was not amortized
until December 31, 1940, with interest amounted to $333
18

million, a tremendous sum considering that the Qing
government’s annual income at the time was estimated to
be about half that amount.59
Despite great internal suffering and disorder, China
successfully survived imperialist pressure during the late
19th and early 20th centuries. In the end, “the ‘breakup of
China’ did not occur . . . partly owing to Chinese dexterity . . .
in balancing one imperialist power against the other.”60
Nonetheless, the trauma of this period of Western
aggression in China left a wellspring of anger and
resentment for past wrongs which reflexively permeates
Chinese nationalistic views of the West today.
The U.S. role in China during the late 19th and early
20th centuries was at best ambiguous. Throughout the
period the United States was proud that it did not try to
establish any colonies in China. However, the United States
readily took advantage of the most favored nation (MFN)
clause, what Fairbanks characterized as a “me-too policy,”61
which gave each treaty power all privileges that any other
power acquired in China beginning from the initial treaties
established between 1842-44, following the Opium War.62
The United States participated in the violent suppression of
the Boxer Rebellion, as well as the imposition of
indemnities, but remitted part of these indemnities in 1908
and the remainder in 192463 on the provision that these
funds “would continue to be made available by China
mainly for educational purpose.”64 The U.S. Open Door
policy toward China, which became the traditional basis of
U.S. policy for decades, helped preserve China’s unity by
constraining dismemberment by foreign powers, but was
intended not to protect China, but rather to ensure equality
of access among the contending foreign powers.65
By the beginning of the 20th century, the United States
had developed a paternalistic view of China, seeking to save
China by transforming it along American lines in religion,
politics, economics, and technology. During this time,
support for the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or
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Kuomintang) under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek
(Jiang Jieshi) who, along with his wife, Song Meiling,
embraced Christianity, developed in the United States,
setting the stage for U.S. involvement in the Chinese Civil
War.66
The United States supported the Nationalist government in its resistance to the Japanese invasion and
occupation, and became openly allied after Pearl Harbor. As
the war in the Pacific came to an end, however, Americans
became disillusioned with the corruption and inefficiencies
of the Nationalists. Some U.S. military officers familiar
with China, such as Marine Captain Evans F. Carlson67 and
Colonel David Barrett (the head of the first contingent to the
Yenan Observer Group, the “Dixie Mission”),68 as well as
other China observers such as Edgar Snow, advocated some
cooperation with the Chinese Communists, but they were
never supported.
During the Chinese Civil War, the United States
provided support and assistance to the Nationalists, who
fled to Taiwan in 1949. This U.S. involvement hardened into
Cold War polarization with the outbreak of the Korean War
in 1950. This Cold War legacy and continued U.S. support of
Taiwan still complicate and threaten bilateral relations.
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
Americans really understand little about Chinese society and
tradition and they readily pass judgment on China according to
their own history and culture, and their prejudice against
communism.
Liu Zongren69
Some senior Chinese Communist Party leaders still see
U.S.-China friction in terms of Cold War struggle between
political systems—a perception which is mirrored by many in
Washington.
David Shambaugh70

20

After World War II, Sino-U.S. cultural differences and
historical experience were intensified through an
ideological prism which pitted Western democracy and
capitalism against communism. The founding of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was a turning
point. In the United States, the victory of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) resulted in a largely ethnocentric
political debate, infected by extreme anti-communist
sentiment,71 over how the United States “lost China,” which
targeted some of America’s best experts on China.
Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of
Germany, and the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union, ideological differences remain germane to present
and future relations between China and the United States.
The Chinese often criticize the United States for remaining
ideologically oriented, while claiming China has moved
beyond ideology to pursue a pragmatic modernization
agenda devoid of Cold War ideology. They emphasize the
socialist rather than the communist nature of post-Deng
China, using the cumbersome, but politically correct
phrase—"socialism with Chinese characteristics"—to
describe the political nature of the present Chinese state.
Further, they point out that China dropped its pursuit of
global communism, while the United States continues to
pursue global democratization.
Even though communism in China today lacks
substance as a guiding ideology, it still retains the
authoritarian domination of a tiny minority of communist
party members. The CCP, which represents only 4.5 percent
of the population, dominates over 50 percent of the positions
in the Chinese government, and retains control over the
commodities, regulations, and investment funds, which fuel
the market economy.72
Further, as John W. Garver has argued, the CCP cadres,
like the aristocratic Junkers of pre-World War I Germany,
are ideologically anti-capitalist. The CCP pursues economic
norms only to improve socialism, not transform it, and to
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keep it firmly under the CCP dictatorship.73 The CCP
cadres, like the Junkers, form a closed elite system. New
members are added, not based on open competition or merit,
but “via a rigorous, top-down process of recommendation
and sponsorship by existing members, together with . . .
review of candidates’ ideas, activities and social origins.”74
In the United States, no new post-Cold War paradigm
has emerged that would permit a dramatic abandonment of
the goal to transform residual communism. If anything, the
objectives of U.S. policy have been broadened to target all
other nondemocratic authoritarian forms, such as
Islamic-dominated states. Whether communism holds
minority power over a tiny and impoverished island such as
Cuba, or an unpredictable but fast declining country such as
North Korea, or the fastest growing economy and one
quarter of the world’s population in China, the ultimate goal
for the United States is to encourage the development of
democracies and market economies.
The “change or die” attitude toward the CCP reflected in
American policy has been characterized by the Chinese as
the threat of Peaceful Evolution. Some American officials
would take this goal even further, as Senator Jessie Helms
has in his sponsorship of Radio Free Asia, by seeking
nothing less than the speedy overthrow of the CCP,
regardless of the consequences. Until and if Communist
Party rule in China and/or the U.S. anti-communism
paradigm are abandoned, ideology will likely persist as an
important dynamic of the relationship.
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PART TWO:
POLITICAL-MILITARY PERSPECTIVES

On the American side . . . [a] lesson of the Korean War is that
ethnocentrism assumed a vital role in U.S. strategic thinking
on Korea. American officials demonstrated a strong tendency
to see ‘the other’ through their own myths and values . . .
American strategists emphasized U.S. technological
superiority. American history itself fostered the perception of
military invincibility . . . Trapped by its own self-image, the
U.S. military hardly paid attention to the strategy and tactics
of the Chinese Communist force.
Shu Guang Zhang75
With the decisive duel between China and the U.S.
imperialists being inevitable, the question is where to do it . . .
Korea as a battleground chosen by the imperialists is
favorable to us . . . Here, we have the most favourable terrain,
the closest communication to China, the most convenient
material and manpower back-up . . . .
Zhou Enlai76

Despite recent improvements, particularly since the
October 1997 Presidential Summit, relations between the
United States and China remain troubled and precarious.
Potential problems over such issues as proliferation, human
rights abuses, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and allegations of illegal
Chinese influence buying hang over bilateral relations,
threatening to precipitate another phase of isolation and
hostility. At this juncture, and within the context of the two
countries’ opposing national security strategies (discussed
above), it is instructive to review the outbreak of the Korean
War as a case study of misperceptions between the United
States and China leading to direct military conflict.
In his classic study, Robert Jervis77 discussed the
influence that perceptions and misperceptions have on
international relations. He identified common mispercep23

tions in relations between state leaders, such as perception
of centralization or overestimating one’s importance as
influence or target. He also discusses the influence that
desires and fears can have on perceptions, and the effects of
cognitive dissonance on international relations. He argued
that greater awareness by leaders of common misperceptions may help minimize their negative effects on
decisionmaking, which “often lead to an overestimation of
the other’s side’s hostility.”78
Jack Levy directly linked misperceptions to the causes of
war79 in their ability to lead to critical miscalculations.
Foremost among these are misperceptions of an adversary’s
intentions or capabilities.80 Others, such as misunderstandings of an adversary’s perceptions, the nature of his
decision-making process, and the “likely behavior and
impact of third states,”81 contribute to misperceptions of an
adversary’s intentions and capabilities.
Levy concluded that the most important misperceptions
are “military overconfidence,” which is based on an
underestimation of an adversary’s capabilities;82 and
“overestimation of the hostility of the adversary’s
intentions,” which could lead to a “preemptive strike.”83 The
outbreak of conflict between the United States and China in
the Korean War provides an example of both these
misperceptions, as well as misperceptions of third states,
specifically China and the former Soviet Union.
The invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June
1950 shocked U.S. leadership. After the end of World War II,
the United States remained focused on Europe, and, while
the desperate need for reconstruction assistance to Korea
was recognized, it was given a lower priority. U.S. forces
were withdrawn from Korea in 1949, leaving behind
ill-prepared South Korean forces to meet the threat from the
better trained and better equipped North Korean People’s
Army (NKPA). Inattention was transformed overnight into
a major commitment of combat forces to a conflict that
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would last until 1953, as Korea became the test case and
proving ground for East-West confrontation.
The Korean War helped reinforce the U.S. threat
perception of the Soviet Union as a hostile power set on
global domination and willing to employ any and all
opportunities to exploit Western weaknesses. It also
reinforced a belief that the Soviet Union, as the leader of the
world communist movement, exercised direction and
leadership over other communist states, including North
Korea and the newly-established People’s Republic of China
(PRC). This U.S. perception of communist unity under
Soviet leadership remained largely unquestioned
throughout the early Cold War. Not until armed conflict
broke out on the Sino-Soviet border in the late 1960s did the
United States seriously reassess this view, thus paving the
way for President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China.
In Korea, the United States remained overwhelmingly
concerned with the intentions and capabilities of the USSR,
but failed to recognize how China, as an independent actor,
might perceive and react to U.S. forces approaching the
Yalu River in late 1950. With the benefit of analysis84 of
telegrams exchanged between Mao Zedong and Joseph
Stalin that were released in the 1980s, as well as recent
access to Soviet archives, we can assess that even though
Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin were aware of the planned
North Korean invasion,85 neither likely initiated the attack.
Both appear to have had their own reservations about the
plan.
In retrospect, we can determine that while the United
States overestimated the USSR capability and intentions in
Korea, it seriously underestimated those of the PRC. Even
before the first Chinese offensive in November 1950,
American intelligence officers in both Tokyo and
Washington agreed on “three core propositions.” First, they
recognized that the Chinese were massing forces in
Manchuria on the border with North Korea. Nonetheless,
they concluded that the Chinese would not likely provide a
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massive effort to the war, because, finally, they evaluated
that the optimum time for Chinese forces to intervene to
help the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had passed
because these forces were no longer combat effective.86
U.S. misperceptions of both Chinese capability and
intentions, as well as a misperception of the role of the
USSR, led to critical miscalculations on the battlefield.
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the
United Nations forces, jeopardized his stunningly
victorious push north after the Inchon Landing when in
November 1950 he ordered his forces to continue to push
north to the Yalu River (the international border between
Korea and China) and liberate all of North Korea.
MacArthur believed (consistent with the intelligence
assessments, as discussed above) that the Chinese would
not “intervene in force . . .[he thought] the Chinese threats
were purely diplomatic blackmail. All evidence that they
were in Korea broke against this preset belief.”87 General
Walton W. Walker, Commander Eighth Army, expressed
the miscalculated confidence of American forces in
November 1950 when he said, “We should not assume that
Chinese Communists are committed in force. After all, a lot
of Mexicans live in Texas.”88
Conversely, based on recent analysis of telegrams and
other documents released in the 1980s, Mao Zedong appears
to have also misperceived U.S. intentions toward China,
because he assumed war with the United States was
inevitable.89 At a CCP Politburo meeting on August 4, 1949,
Mao concluded: “If the U.S. imperialists win [the war in
Korea], they may get so dizzy with success that they may
threaten us. We therefore must come to [North] Korea’s aid
and intervene in the name of a volunteer army.” 90
Consequently, Mao ordered a counterattack in Korea to
preempt expansion of the war into China.
Two additional miscalculations should also be
examined. These occurred after the Chinese decision to
intervene in the Korean War with the Chinese People’s
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Volunteers (CPV) forces. First, the U.S. forces failed to
correctly assess the initial contact with the CPV. After their
initial unexpected attack, the CPV suddenly withdrew
during their first campaign on October 21-25. This
withdrawal was either a tactical move to lure the enemy
deeper as the commander, General Peng Dehuai claimed,91
or (possibly) a last opportunity to cause the U.S. forces to
pull back. Instead, the United States interpreted the
withdrawal as a retreat and continued advancing to
disastrous results in November. A second major miscalculation, similar to this, but made by the Chinese, occurred
during the third Chinese campaign beginning in December
1950, when Chinese forces attempted to push further south
in spite of overextended supply lines and exhausted forces.
They were thrown back, and the war eventually settled into
a series of see-saw, positional battles along the 38th
parallel.
Some scholars,92 as well as Chinese official pronouncements, have persistently argued that China’s strategic
culture is essentially nonthreatening. According to this
argument, China was historically and will remain
anti-imperialist in the future and will never seek hegemony,
and will not likely seek to project global power beyond its
normal sphere of influence within Asia. Alastair Johnston
refutes this assumption,93 demonstrating that there are
actually two strategic cultures in Chinese tradition. One,
the symbolic or ideal, is peaceful and nonviolent. The
second, however, “argues that the best way of dealing with
security threats is to eliminate them through the use of
force.”94 What Johnston calls the “parabellum approach to
conflict” in Chinese strategic culture offers an important
perspective to consider when assessing Chinese strategic
intentions and capabilities.
In the PRC’s brief history it has demonstrated a
willingness to use force when its national interests are
threatened. Since its founding on October 1, 1949, the PRC
has resorted to force no less than 12 times: takeover of Tibet
(October 1950 - October 1951); Korean War (1950-53);
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Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55); Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
(1958); Sino-Indian Border War (1962); Vietnam War
(1964-70); Sino-Soviet Border Clash (1969); Parcel Islands
(1974); Sino-Vietnam Border War (1979); Sino-Indian
Border Skirmishes (1986-87); Spratly Islands (1988); and
Taiwan (1995).95 To this list we must add two recent
instances of the use of force by the Chinese: the Mischief
Reef incident (in the fall of 1995) and the anti-Taiwan
election exercises (March 1996).
The United States, however, has shown an even greater
propensity to use military force or the threat of it to promote
its own interests. During the March 1996 Chinese military
exercises, which resulted in the effective blockade of north
and south Taiwan ports, the U.S. military dispatched two
aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan to
demonstrate U.S. concern. One listing claims the United
States has intervened militarily at least 114 times since
1890. 96 Interestingly, this list includes 12 domestic
interventions and 6 separate incidents97 of the use or threat
of military force in China or against the Chinese military.
The 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS) claims that the
U.S. military has deployed about 40 times since 1989 to
“assist in security or humanitarian crises.”98
Since both countries have shown a willingness to use
force to protect and promote their national interests and, at
the same time, have also demonstrated an ability in both
peace and war to miscalculate the other’s intentions and
capabilities, it makes the matter of national security
between the two countries all the more serious and
potentially dangerous, particularly as China’s own
comprehensive power provides it the means to stand up to
the United States.
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PART THREE:
PROSPECTS - A NEW PARADIGM?

History tells us that both will reap the benefit from our
cooperation while neither can escape the harm of our
confrontation. Our people do not want to see stagnation or
retrogression in bilateral relations. The right choice for us to
make is to proceed from the reality of China-U.S. relations,
take a global perspective and look into the next century,
expand common ground, and overcome disturbances and
difficulties in pushing the relations forward. Only in so doing
can we bring benefits to our two peoples and make new
contributions to world peace and development.
Jiang Zemin99
We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great
differences . . . As we discuss our differences, neither of us will
compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf
between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to
talk across it . . . What legacy shall we leave our children? Are
they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old
world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to
build a new world?
Richard Nixon100

Both sides periodically argue (as if they are trying to
convince themselves and/or domestic audiences) that there
are important bilateral interests that bind the United
States and China. Theoretically, these common interests
should transcend negative factors in state relations, and
eventually lessen the tendency toward a boom-bust cycle.
The development of mature, cooperative relations, however,
will remain protracted and doubtful for the foreseeable
future. Quick fixes and major breakthroughs are largely
self-delusions and will be few and far between without a
common enemy or other factors to submerge the negative
elements of U.S.-China relations.
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As the new century approaches, both China and the
United States remain locked in their respective perceptions
of the past and how U.S.-China relationships are or should
be. U.S. policy and special interest groups present a shifting
and confusing mixed bag of approaches and concerns,
which, with no small amount of patronizing, hope to “save”
the Chinese people from their own authoritarian
government, protect them from human rights abuses,
provide them with freedom of religion, protect them against
coercive abortions without providing any alternative to a
crushing population problem, and promote independence
for minority groups, such as the Tibetans, regardless of the
consequence to internal unity. There are still many who
would like to expunge communism once and for all from
China. These people only see that the Chinese Communist
Party remains in power. They do not appreciate the Party’s
historic link to Chinese independence and its ability to
stand up to the West after over a century of failures. They
also do not appreciate that, although the CCP retains
power, it already lacks ideological meaning having been
discredited by the Cultural Revolution and, since the
successful modernization drive began in 1979, co-opted into
the socialist market economy, which in substance, if not
form, is essentially a variant on capitalism.
For their part, the Chinese leadership, beset with
internal problems and the seemingly endless issue of
leadership succession, is only too willing to blame the
United States for its problems, recalling 19th century
Western oppression and victimization whenever pressure is
applied. At the same time that they demand special
treatment and consideration, they also demand respect and
regard commensurate with all great powers. They see
conspiracy, plots, and grand designs on the part of the
United States, even when a coherent U.S. policy is lacking.
Both China and the United States frequently resort to
warnings, ostracism, and threats of punishment when
frustrated by their dealings with one another. Both even
willingly neglect relations, viewing state-to-state contacts
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more as a reward for good behavior than part of normal
bilateral relations.
Although many would blame the latest disruption in
U.S.-China relations on Tiananmen, mutual uncertainty
had already crept into the relationship by the late 1980s, if
not earlier, as detente between the United States and the
former Soviet Union undermined the rationale for U.S.China rapprochement. Prior to Tiananmen, some Chinese
even lost sight of common interests that would make
relations with the United States important. In 1988, for
example, when the translation of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise
and Fall of Great Powers became a best seller in China, it
was common to hear how the United States “needed” China
far more than China needed the United States. Those who
hold this view argued that the United States, as a declining
power, needed China’s cheap labor and investment
opportunities in order to help prop up its economy and help
pay for its massive national debt. According to this
argument, China could certainly make use of U.S.
technology and investment, but if the United States would
not provide them, China could turn to other sources.101
The list of mutual interests often cited by both sides
includes such idealistic interests as world and regional
peace, stability, and prosperity, as well as specific common
interests, such as trade and promoting peace and stability
in Korea. The United States has spelled out in the NSS its
own separate addendum of such diverse national interests
as nonproliferation, protection of individual property
rights, human rights, and environmental protection. The
list of reasons for contacts with the United States on the
Chinese side is more focused. China primarily seeks U.S.
technology, investment, enforcement of the Three Joint
Communiques,102 an end to U.S. arms sales and other
support to Taiwan, and American respect for China.
Unfortunately, none of these interests, whether or not
recognized by both parties, resonates in the same way that a
common enemy did in the past. None of these has yet been

31

sufficiently strong to set relations on a stable and enduring
foundation.
As we find ourselves in yet another period of improved
atmospherics and high expectations for change, it is
sobering to remember that nothing has fundamentally
changed in the relationship. Recent improvements may
prove to be only the lull in the storm rather than a
manifestation of fundamental change in the bilateral
relationship. But is it realistic to expect fundamental
change? What, if anything, can be done to break out of the
boom-bust paradigm?
Of all the issues dividing the two countries, Taiwan
offers the greatest potential for near-term military conflict.
Another Taiwan crisis could directly lead to hostilities,
entangling the United States in dangerous ways. The
Chinese military, for example, could perceive that a
preemptive strike in the form of a missile attack, blockade,
or internal sabotage is vital to the preservation of China’s
national sovereignty. The basis for the military attack may
already exist. Taiwan’s relentless drive for “international
space” and its recent abolition of the position of governor
effectively removes the remaining pretense that Taiwan is a
province of China, rather than a de facto country.
Under these circumstances, Beijing could conclude, as
Mao did in 1950 in Korea, that China has no choice but to
intervene militarily in Taiwan. Chinese leaders could
assume that striking quickly to punish Taiwan would be an
acceptable risk, because the United States would not likely
intervene when presented with a fait accompli. Although it
is impossible to predict what would happen in such a crisis,
there is good reason to believe that a preemptive military
strike, blockade, or sabotage against Taiwan would lead to
miscalculation on China’s part, and that military action
against Taiwan would likely precipitate a military reaction
from the United States, as occurred in March 1996.
On the other hand, American misperceptions,
specifically underestimation of China’s military capability
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and intentions toward Taiwan, could lead to miscalculation,
which could precipitate conflict. America’s strong support of
the Taiwanese government, continued arms sales, and
recent statements by high-ranking political figures that the
United States would defend Taiwan103 could inadvertently
encourage increasingly provocative actions by President
Lee Teng-hui. These actions could become the catalyst for
Chinese military preemptive action against Taiwan, even
though many American analysts judge China ill-prepared,
or assume that such action would be counterproductive to
China’s national interests, and, therefore, least likely in the
near term.
Although prospects for good relations between the
United States and China are questionable at this point,
conflict can still be avoided. Unforeseen events and
incidents could even shift the United States and China
closer together, once more submerging differences in much
the same way as the strategic convergence China and the
United States achieved in the 1970s to counterbalance the
former Soviet Union. A resurgent Russia or other power, or
the spread of a Muslim-fundamentalist revolution through
Central Asia into China’s western Xinjiang Province, for
example, could provide the basis for renewed strategic
cooperation.
Even without compelling outside strategic forces to bind
them closer together, the United States and China have the
opportunity to avoid conflict and reshape Sino-American
relations into the next century. For this to happen, peace
over the long term must be a genuine goal of both countries.
Both must recognize the risks of conflict and the benefits of
enduring peace. The efforts of one country, no matter how
well orchestrated or sophisticated, are insufficient to ensure
peace between China and the United States. Pursuit of
genuine peace must not be, nor must it be perceived to be,
merely a near-term objective used as a tactical ploy by
either country to prepare for future confrontation. Such a
strategy could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, exponentially
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fueling distrust and precipitating conflict over the long
term.
If China, for example, uses (or is perceived to use)
near-term peace with the United States only as a means to
develop more comprehensive power and military projection
capability in order to promote national interests directly
hostile to the United States over the long term, such as
military enforcement of sovereignty over Taiwan or the
South China Seas, it would likely undermine peace.
Conversely, if the United States uses (or is perceived to use)
peace as a guise to evaluate China’s intentions and
capabilities, in order to hedge its bets against a future China
threat by attempting to enmesh China within the
international system before it achieves peer power status,
this also could undermine peace.
China’s intense secrecy over all national security
matters, a historical view of itself as the only injured party
rather than a contributor to problems in state-to-state
relations, as well as a deep suspicion of malevolent plots and
grand strategy on the part of the United States, help feed
distrust, miscommunication, and misperceptions between
the two countries. China’s sometimes petulant demands for
international respect, combined with demands for special or
compensatory treatment, make it difficult for many in the
United States to regard China with a level of respect that
characterizes U.S. relations with European countries, for
example.
For their part, U.S. leaders should recognize that the
U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement directly threatens non-Western cultures. The
United States should at least recognize that many,
including the Chinese, perceive the promotion of democracy
and human rights as low cost containment by another
name. Although there may be convergence of international
agreement on human rights, the U.S.’s failure to embrace
other world views now will only undermine its position,
particularly if its power declines in relative terms over the
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long term. Further, the unquestioned assumption that
enmeshing China in the Western international order, to
influence its behavior, has yet to prove to be more than
wishful thinking.
Both countries need a better understanding of one
another’s world views and political nature. When China
sees the United States as a conspiratorial, unified actor,
ruled by an anti-Chinese press, it fails to understand the
complexities of the American balance of power system, the
role of special interest groups, and the romantic (if
somewhat hypocritical) American notion of international
norms and Western values. Consequently, the United
States tends to project its values on China, expecting
“normal, rational” and Western behavior from the Chinese,
when the Chinese value other things (such as stability).
Although it is wrong for the Chinese or the Americans to
project each country’s own views on the other, it is equally
wrong to assume both countries are too different. If both
countries are ever to break the boom-bust cycle in
U.S.-China relations, state relations must mature to a level
of mutual respect. Greater knowledge and experience can
help, especially if they cut across a wider range of the public.
One lesson of history is clear—the world is continually
changing. The polarization of the Cold War era obscured
this principle. Power relationships will shift:
so far as the international system is concerned, wealth and
power, or economic strength and military strength, are always
relative . . . and since all societies are subject to the inexorable
tendency to change, then the international balances can never
be still, and it is a folly of statesmanship to assume that they
ever will be.104

Both the United States and China will have to build a
mature and cooperative relationship within the reality of
change in the future.
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